Didi – take a bow?

http://www.udayindia.org/content_07april2012/cover-story.html 

Didi – take a bow?

Uddipan Mukherjee

 

While evaluating the role of Mahatma Gandhi in Indian History, Subhas Bose asserts: “The role which a man plays in history depends partly on his physical and mental equipment, and partly on the environment and the needs of times in which he is born.”

However, Mamata Banerjee could not be – at least, as of yet – compared to the Father of the Nation. Nevertheless, at the same time, it won’t be impertinent to assess her role in Indian politics till date – more so after her ascension to the position of Chief Minister of West Bengal on 20^th May 2011. Ten months – highly eventful – have elapsed since then. The climax was reached when Didi’s own man Dinesh Trivedi came out with a Railway Budget which though made a giant out of a political midget but had a number of extra-parliamentary ramifications; viz.

1.   It was unequivocally clear that coalition politics had reached its troublesome peak.

2.   Policy making at the National level has become a diminutive affair, if not a complete nonsense.

3.   Contradictions within the Trinamool Congress (TC) are out in the open but we also need to read between the lines.

4.   Nobody bothers to talk about the credibility of the UPA-II government; no, not any more.

The Trivedi Affair

The latest from TC supremo, at the time of weaving this piece was: “TC will quit UPA-II if it is humiliated”, Ms Banerjee told CNN-IBN, but further affirmed that the party does not want to topple the government. While defending her decision to sack Railway Minister Dinesh Trivedi, she said that he had kept the party in dark on the fare hike and it was her right to name the Railway Minister and the Congress could not interfere.

Yes, Didi, you are right because you hardly could be wrong. But doesn’t this whole Trivedi Affair tarnish the image of your own party? Even if we agree that he kept you in dark regarding the price hikes, which Mr Trivedi acknowledged publicly, does it not mean that you have people in your own party over whom your control does not work? Is Trivedi a saboteur? And if that is the case indeed as far as Trivedi is concerned, why not cancel the primary party membership of Trivedi? Didi, so many questions remain unanswered.

 

Why are you diffident to dislodge the dissident MP Kabir Suman when he openly subscribes to the Maoists and maligns the credibility of your party? Do these acts reflect your largesse? Or are these simply a sign of an immature and confused politician who fails to manage the state of affairs? Both the interpretations would be hard to digest unless we are nincompoops – which the Aam Aadmi – themanush whom you have vowed to serve – are not; simply put, not.

 

This author interacted with the Manush of Bengal; oops, Paschimbanga, after the railway Budget 2012-13 was unveiled and TC supremo’s dictates from Kalighat in Kolkata were unleashed. Apart from coming across normal assessments of the budget of whether price was justified or not with people taking sides on a normal basis, a comment from a middle-aged academic in Kolkata was worth noting. The professor said:

 

“The decision of Ms. Banerjee after the budget is farcical. The hike
would take place - if not wholly, but partially at least. Mr Trivedi would once
again be reinforced in TC after few months with a new portfolio. Well
the history of TC points to that and it would happen. It is just to
gain the political sympathy of 70 per cent or more of not ‘too rich’ Aam Admi it has been fabricated. All the hullabaloo will only increase and improve
the TRP of TC.”

Didi, are you listening? Is the professor’s assessment true? Or is it a mere rambling? Let us all forget about the degradation of Paschimbanga’s image in the national fora, at least after a long long time, the Bengalees are having something to cheer about in the Great Indian Political Drama. And Ms Banerjee was unrelenting, as she said: “We would roll back the hike in lower class fares”.

You are absolutely correct and we applaud. However, what about Trivedi? If he has been ‘coerced’ to quit, he should be further ‘forced’ to leave the party. After all, how can you provide shelter to saboteurs? Didi, whole India is looking towards you for justice.

At the other end, Dinesh Trivedi is obdurate and defends his policy of increasing the fares. He is supposed to have consulted the ‘common man’ before formulating the revolutionary budget, and not his party supremo! So, what does all this drama indicate? Still, hard to decipher in exactitude. Nonetheless, a couple of options emerge for us.

1.   The Railway Budget could have been engineered by the Congress – in order to facilitate their own policy decisions to hike prices

2.   The Railway Budget, in the Trivedi-format, would have proved to be a boon for the Congress party as it would shut up the Maa, Maati and Manush slogan of the TC.

3.           But who carried out the masterstroke would probably be palpable with time. Presently, you and I can merely speculate.

 The Other Affairs

Since inception to office, Ms Banerjee is in news. It is no wonder that she should have been the darling of the media – at least in West Bengal – for historic as well as ‘other’ reasons. And she has paid back to the media by nominating three editors for Rajya Sabha membership. Eulogy pays and the ‘other’ editors now realize it fully. She was also religiously and linguistically secular by picking up editors of a Hindi daily, an Urdu daily and a Bengali news channel respectively, along with Mukul Roy- Banerjee’s trusted lieutenant.

 

 Rajya Sabha and the Gorkhas

Bengal’s Industries Minister Partha Chatterjee announced the names of Union Minister of State Mukul Roy and journalists Kunal Ghosh, Mohammed Nadim-ul-Haq and Vivek Gupta as TC’s candidates for the Upper House of Parliament.

Ghosh is the associate editor of Bengali daily 'Sangbad Pratidin', Haq is the  Executive Editor of the Urdu daily 'Akhbar-E-Mashriq' and Gupta is the director of Hindi daily 'Sanmarg'.

"Mukul Roy, Nadim-ul-Haq and Kunal Ghosh are the first three candidates. Gupta is the fourth candidate. Roy has been re-nominated," Chatterjee told reporters.

Through such a decision, Didi might have planned to win the propaganda war. However, in the process she has jeopardized her camaraderie with the Gorkhas. On 18^th March, Bimal Gurung said: "The Trinamool Congress Government is walking on the paths of the earlier Left Front Government. They have conspired to damage our party. Time and again we have accorded her warm welcome to the Hills. Prior to her, no Chief Minister had ever received such welcome. Yet she has failed to reciprocate. During the signing of the GTA agreement and during her recent visit to Darjeeling, she stated that she will not allow Bengal to be divided; yet we remained silent. But now she has broken the 45 year old tradition of fielding a Rajya Sabha MP from Darjeeling. We vehemently oppose this."

 

 The College Principals

First it was the Raiganj College on 5^th January 2012. Thereafter it was followed by two other attacks on Principals of colleges. Interestingly, TC was linked to two of the three incidents. Bobby Hakim, a TC minister commented rather rudely: “Respect cannot be demanded. Respect has to be earned. And the principals have to behave.” Stupendous. It was apt for a goonda-raaj Minister.

And to add to the emotional woes of the Principals, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee accused the Marxists of appointing "political recruits" to key posts across the state during their rule. Well, this might be true to a large extent. But was it apt for a Chief Minister to pass such comments in the wake of political violence? Didi, are we living in a lawless state? Is this not systematized form of ‘systemic anarchy’? Didi, are you listening?

To quote media reports: "The comrades (CPI-M) have appointed these political principals. What will the new government do? Are we going to worship them? I don't want the principals to be beaten up. But whoever is involved in corrupt practices, they will have to face investigation," said Banerjee.

Didi, shouldn’t we be a little more merciful towards the hapless academics? We agree, that they might as well have been handpicked by the ‘comrades’; but will such rhetoric not send wrong waves among the student community? We will again be pushed to Mao’s Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution where professors and teachers were rebuked and beaten up in public to ‘teach them lessons’.

Didi, will you open the outlet of your merciful reservoir only on Trivedi, Mukul Roy and Kabir Suman? What about us? If the present Principals are political recruits, then will you guarantee us that from now on, all academic posts shall be filled up without political interference?

 

NCTC and Teesta

"The NCTC is worse than TADA and POTA", said Banerjee after meeting the Prime Minister on 19^th March. She also defended her party's walk out in the Lok Sabha on the NCTC. “The Trinamool Congress is part of the Government. It cannot vote against and therefore it has maintained decorum by walking out.”

The pressured Prime Minister in fact said in the Lok Sabha on the same day that the proposed National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) would be formed only after adequate consultations with state governments. Let us see in what direction this drama proceeds.

However, till now, Mamata-di had been most belligerent vis-à-vis her senior partner in UPA-II in the case of Teesta water sharing issue with Bangladesh. Manmohan Singh had to work extremely hard, although in a futile manner, to save India’s diplomatic face in front of our trusted ally – the Sheikh Hasina government.  

Interestingly, the same Banerjee who made Dr Singh a humble being in front of the Bangladeshis during his trip to Dhaka told Dipu Moni, the Bangladesh foreign minister:

"The people of Bangladesh want Teesta water. It is their long-standing demand. We appreciate their demand. We will be glad if water can be shared," Banerjee told newsmen at the secretariat in the presence of Moni in mid-November 2011.

Banerjee went on record: "We will definitely do what we can. We love Bangladesh. We will have to see that Bengal does not face water shortage and Bangladesh also gets water. We will have to see what can be done about this. Therefore we have sought expert opinion. After we get their report we will give our view."

Banerjee’s stance in this matter has made her a villain not only in the national fora but also in the international domain; especially for the Bangladeshis. For instance, barrister Harun Ur Rashid from Bangladesh writes: “The survival of Manmohan Singh’s 20-party coalition government depends on the support of 19 MPs from the Trinimool Congress. Therefore, New Delhi cannot afford to politically annoy Ms. Banerjee.”

 

Rashid further asserts: “Coalition governments everywhere suffer conflicting pressures from different party components, and the Teesta water-sharing appears to have become a victim of political maneuvering between New Delhi and Kolkata. Interestingly, records tell us that Bangladesh could not sign any water agreement either with the Congress or BJP-led government in New Delhi.”

 

So, what is the upshot of the above chain of factoids? Is Didi totally Bengal-centric? If that is the case, then why is she trying to expand her base in Manipur? In fact, TC has bagged 7 out of 60 seats in the 2012 Assembly elections. A commendable performance indeed! But to expand her base in other states, she might need help of the Congress. Even in Bengal, she would need the partnership of the Congress to keep the Marxists at bay. So, why is Didi creating chasm between TC and the Congress? Will she cling to BJP when time shall be ripe?

 

Is Banerjee a die-hard believer in Federalism? Or does her behaviour bespeak an erratic, mismanaged, autocratic and seamlessly aimless leader of errant cadres? Time will surely tell.

 

 

Can we conclude?

 

A facebook comment posted on the author’s wall in the aftermath of the Trivedi affair is worth mentioning:

 

“Budget apart, Didigiri is holding the whole country to ransom! With just 19 seats in the Lok Sabha she is virtually ruling the country!

 

The whole country is virtually at the mercy of her whims! What a terrible outcome for democracy - the spineless Congress is playing to her tune shamelessly to avoid a fresh mandate but those nincompoops are not realising or avoiding to realise that nothing will change between now and 2014. So by resigning they can avoid the daily humiliation from Didigiri at least! She is openly blackmailing the government, enacting daily childish pranks, behaving in a cantankerous way not befitting a Chief Minister….....and enjoying as 'mastans' do while bullying weak people!!”

 

However, Banerjee might not, still, deserve such a scathing rebuke. Another chance can as well be bestowed upon her.

 

The electorates of West Bengal hardly had any choice - after witnessing the Left misrule, ill-governance, party cadres' vanity; they could only elect Trinamool Congress – the only viable political alternative in Parliamentary Democracy. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly a fact that Ms Banerjee's honesty was never in doubt. In addition to that, she was extremely resilient and full of energy.

 

We need to give her some time before we could judge her comprehensively. By all means, 2 to 3 years have to be granted to her. Her treasury is bankrupt. Moreover, at the present juncture, it seems that she is losing control on her rowdy cadres; and at times, even some leaders.

 

This author had essayed a Cover Story for Uday India on 16^th April 2011, a month before the Assembly election results were declared in West Bengal – in which he wrote: “If Bengal has to grow holistically, then it needs a ‘fresh’ regime with a strong, vocal and learned opposition.”

 

Eleven months down, the author does not feel ‘out’. Rather he still fervently believes that the ‘change’ in West Bengal was necessary. And it might be pre-mature to predict the Fall of the ‘Reich’ so soon. But with a maverick Chief Minister and her ruffian elements, Bengal is definitely witnessing a historical phase in its politics. And alongwith Bengal, the rest of India too.

 

In fact, this author had admonished in the said piece:

 

 “Banerjee’s TMC will have its task cut out if it emerges victorious. A debt-ridden beleaguered exchequer, the Maoist-menace, the aspirations of a number of neo-TMC cadres and above all, the hopes of over 80 million denizens of Bengal could turn out to be extremely onerous.”

 

The warning has not gone in vain. 

What is the Chongqing Model?

STRATFOR's paper on the domestic-consumption led growth model in China

Summary 

The Chinese government is taking notice of recent economic and social successes in the inland city of Chongqing. Anchored by economic initiatives that promote domestic consumption, as opposed to the traditional export-oriented focus of China's coastal region, the so-called Chongqing model has been seen as responsible for the city's prosperity as growth slows in the rest of the country, and it appears to be under consideration for widespread implementation. However, a number of issues inherent in the model, including strong central control and massive government investment, will need to be addressed before it can become a viable, nationwide plan.

Analysis

Chinese state-run media recently published a series of reports detailing the economic success and social achievements of the southwestern city of Chongqing. The reports praised the so-called Chongqing model, which is characterized by its unique approach to stimulating both the economy and ideological passion in its citizens, saying it is a reflection of current Communist Party of China (CPC) doctrines. Also, Chinese leadership has been visiting the city in the past few months.

This praise suggests Beijing may be reversing its earlier perceptions of the Chongqing model -- and its architect, CPC Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai -- and may be a sign that both are gaining acceptance from China's political leadership. However, while the merits to the model are evidenced by Chongqing's successes, there will be constraints to its widespread implementation.

An Unorthodox New Direction

Chongqing, one of four Chinese municipalities administered by the central government, is located far inland from the country's political and economic center along the coast. Its heavy industry-based economy, its position as one of the Yangtze River's largest inland ports and its history as a political center in the 1930s-40s have made it the economic hub of Western China. However, the country's economic base has migrated eastward in the intervening years. The industrial upgrading of coastal cities since the mid-1980s and a massive reform of Chongqing's state-owned enterprises resulted in Chongqing lagging behind most first- and many second-tier Chinese cities economically. At the same time, factors such as deep-rooted corruption among the political and business elite, powerful organized criminal elements and high urban unemployment exacerbated by a large influx of rural migrants made it an environment conducive to social instability.

Upon his appointment to Chongqing in 2007, Bo implemented a series of initiatives to address both economic and social problems, including a massive crackdown on organized crime and the eradication of powerful political clans in the city. At the same time, Bo began a "Red campaign" that promoted CPC ideology by, among other tactics, advocating the teachings of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong and mandating the recital of nationalist songs. These high profile, controversial initiatives made Bo a polarizing figure among Chinese politicians, but little attention was paid to Chongqing's development.

For the economy, Bo took the municipality's focus away from the traditional export-based model of Chinese coastal cities and began developing domestic investment and consumption through government-led infrastructure projects, favorable policy incentives and relatively equalized social allocation. With abundant labor and resources in the region, Chongqing is largely self-sufficient -- and thus largely shielded from external vulnerability: During the 2008 economic crisis the country's gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to 9 percent, but Chongqing's GDP grew by 14.3 percent. Domestic consumption rose to about 50 percent of the economy, far above the national average of about 30 percent. Chongqing also became an attractive destination for foreign investment, which increased from $311 million in 2003 to $6.3 billion in 2010.

Importantly, this economic boom has not deepened the wealth gap among its residents, as has happened elsewhere. The social initiatives on which the Chongqing model is based encourage massive urbanization through relatively equalized wealth distribution and expanding coverage of social security networks (one official described these initiatives in terms of dividing a cake more equally, giving rise to the term "cake theory"). In 2011, household income for the Chongqing municipality's urban and rural populations increased by 15.5 percent and 22 percent respectively, significantly higher than the national average. Meanwhile, unlike in other Chinese cities where governments would make massive profits from land grabs, Chongqing allowed the rural population to retain ownership of their land even after urbanizing and helped them with temporary social welfare. As a result, the urbanization of 3.2 million people has not resulted in major unrest or grievances.

Beijing Takes Notice

The 2008 financial crisis accentuated the need for Chinese leadership to restructure the economy. For decades, China's economic model was based on a low-end manufacturing sector sustained by an abundance of inexpensive labor and booming external demand, as well as on support for small- to medium-sized private enterprises. However, the former was hit hard by its vulnerability to the global economy and increasing social instability resulting from a combination of low wages, rising unemployment and increasing costs of goods, while the latter was affected by growing governmental favoritism toward large state-owned businesses and centralized economic control.

With the coastal model risking failure, Beijing has taken notice of Chongqing's success, which appears to provide a solution to these issues in a way that appeals to renewed leftist sentiment in the central government. As China faces greater economic and social complexities, the central government may see the Chongqing model as something that can be applied across the country with regional modifications.

However, there are several issues inherent in the model that may impede its long-term success and widespread adoption. First, unlike in coastal regions where businesses and lower-level authorities are granted greater autonomy in their activities, the Chongqing model relies on a much more centralized economic authority, the city's municipal government, which retains strong control over fiscal revenues, local resources and economic activities. This control has allowed Chongqing to implement massive infrastructure projects to attract investment and, at the same time, disburse relatively equalized subsidies to the public to prevent social instability. Adopting the Chongqing model in other regions of China would require strong fiscal health and centralized support. That strong centralized command leaves the model vulnerable to misallocation of resources and wealth by those in power.

Meanwhile, despite the model engendering higher domestic consumption, the economy still is driven by massive government investment, which has resulted in large fiscal deficit and a government debt of up to 800 billion yuan ($126 billion), according to some estimates. This kind of investment has provided the city an interim economic boost, but it is unsustainable in the long term, posing financial risks and endangering development (in much the same way China's massive stimulus efforts in 2008-09 are continuing to affect the country). In addition, government-dominated investment activities are generally made via large business deals with powerful enterprises, which carry a higher risk of government-business relationships that could lead to corruption and the squeezing out of smaller private entities.

From a political view, the prominence of the Chongqing model comes from innovative local governance based on regional variance. But, as the government navigates through a leadership transition set for this year, the Chongqing model may also be an example that local politicians consider for the short term. The economic and social problems it has the potential to create must be addressed before it can become a viable, nationwide alternative to China's current economic model.

Insurgencies – Trajectories in 2012

2011 happened to be a singularly remarkable year insofar as insurgencies and terrorism were concerned. 


The month of May marked the death of Osama bin Laden – a pinnacle of glory for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN).  At the other end, the insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and other parts of the world felt the touch of the nadir; at least psychologically, if not materially and operationally.

In this backdrop, it seems verily pre-ordained that non-state actors are likely to lose steam in the New Year. However, it is pertinent to quote in this regard, the predictions of the National Intelligence Council of USA:

“The relative power of non-state actors is likely to have an upward trend by 2025.”

Hence, terrorism will likely continue, as per the prediction, but its appeal could lessen if economic growth emerges and consequent youth unemployment is reduced. As the resources on the earth would deplete, the surface of the globe shall be replete with acts of anarchism and disruption. Mundane problems will transcend to the realm of the transnational. 


When a bubbling youth will be unable to accommodate himself within the structures of socio-economic and political framework of Pakistan; then the fertile plains of Punjab will continue to help germinate Islamist terror network.

It may be said that 2012 would certainly provide a range of technologies and scientific knowledge to the insurgents and terrorist networks. Under economic duress, conditions shall be ripe for radicalism and possible recruitment of youths into terrorist groups. 

South and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa will remain as the potential areas of unrest. At the micro-level, fragility of the newly founded democracies of Libya and Kyrgyzstan would be tested. Even not so weak states would be pushed a bit. The likes of Chechnya and Dagestan will continue to trouble the Russians, albeit sporadically. 


Such a nuisance may spin a web of transnational tie-ups in the campaign of COIN: the cold-war protagonists, along-with China - with its perturbation in Xinjiang and Tibet, may join hands in combating terror. At least in the warm waters of the Persian Gulf a plethora of counter-insurgents shall be seen to team up against the adventurism of the Somali pirates.  


Nonetheless, the Af-Pak theatre may see only the American soldiers languishing; with their compatriots from other nation-states slowly evacuating as the basic reason for their camaraderie is no more. But the Russian interest will remain in Afghanistan - partly for historical reasons and partly, for the geopolitical. 

It may not be frippery to predict that irregular warfare would rule the roost in 2012.  In the process, urban areas would possibly be targeted more. Insurgencies are likely to be fuelled by various elements; viz. ideology, social, economic and political oppression, internally displaced peoples etc. 


Communist insurgents in Philippines and India would stick to their faith in protracted people’s war. Peace talks may wane as those were mere facades erected by the communist insurgents to prolong their existence. 

Dormant insurgencies, viz. in Sri Lanka, may shoot up if the Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) component of the COIN operations are not suitably put into practice. 

Conflict resolution methodology would bank upon the dual techniques of pro-people COIN as well as targeted killings and incarcerations. Procedural law will keep on being implemented while the substantive part may be missing in the magistracy of the counterinsurgents.

The Maoist movement in India – government apathy, tribal insurrection or ideological dogmatism?

The following is an interview given by me to Ms Vironica Fernandes, a post-graduate student of Media and Films at New York, USA in November 2011. She will be using this in her thesis & her film on Naxalites. The text is to appear in the coming issue of the WILL magazine. 

Q1. Kindly layout the history of the Maoist movement in India briefly

ANS: The Maoist insurrection shot into prominence in India in the form of the Naxal uprising in a remote village of Naxalbari in the Darjeeling district of the eastern Indian province of West Bengal. It was way back in 1967, when a sharecropper called Bigul kisan attempted to take hold of his land with a court order. He was thwarted by the goons of the zamindar. Thus, he and his fellow farmers retaliated with spears and other indigenous weapons.

The movement that followed was called Naxal rebellion. It was spearheaded by the intellectuals based in Calcutta. The initial phase of the movement faded away in a matter of 4 years with the incarceration & killing of its top leadership.

It disintegrated further with ideological schisms. However, in the 1980s, the mantle of leadership was transferred to the intellectuals of Andhra. Kondapally Seetharamaiah took hold of the leadership. By then, the Naxals had 2 major factions:

a.   Maoist Communist Centre (active in Bihar-Jharkhand)

b.   People’s War group (active in Andhra)

In 2004, the 2 factions re-united and formed the Communist Party of India (Maoist). After the re-union, the impact due to the rebels has gone up by leaps and bounds. Presently, they are active in almost 1/4^th of the Indian landmass.

Q3. How did you come about being an active voice to this movement? Explain to us your involvement/participation to give a voice to this movement?

ANS: I would define myself to be an ‘external’ viewer of this movement. I analyse, theorise and then strategize regarding this movement. I do not lend any ‘voice’ to this movement. I try to develop analytical tools to understand the reason behind this insurgency. I attempt to postulate the various modes of counterinsurgency and compare the Maoist insurrection in India with insurgencies in other parts of the world; specifically the communist upheaval in Phillipines.

To understand the plight of the tribal people of India run in parallel to the above study.

Q4. How exactly in one word would you term the current Maoist situation in India?

AND: Always difficult to describe the situation in one word. But if that’s the case, then let it be: “Grave”; at least as far as rural India is concerned.

Q5. What exactly is the current situation in the maoists areas? And can you give us some clarity on the spread of the Maoists in the country.

ANS: In the Maoist strongholds, they run their ‘own’ form of government: called the ‘Janathana Sarkar’. They call their areas as Liberated Zones. The interior districts of Chhattisgarh, parts of Jharkhand, Bihar, western part of West Bengal, eastern Maharashtra, Andhra-Orissa border are mostly ‘dominated’ by the Maoists.

In these areas, there goes on a constant struggle between the Maoist guerrillas and the police & para-military. And caught in the crossfire are the hapless tribals

(for reference: http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2010/02/caught-in-the-crossfire/)

As far as spread of the guerrillas is concerned, I guess I have spelt that out in Q2. To re-iterate, out of 604 districts in India, about 150 are Maoist-affected.

Q6. Is there a political structure that the Maoists follow? What is their hierarchy? What is their belief and ideologies if any that follow?

ANS: Yes. They believe in setting up a proletariat-led communist society. 

They have adopted the doctrines of Karl Marx and the warfare tactics (guerrilla warfare) of Mao Zedong.

They believe in a vanguard party; having a strictly regimented structure with a General Secretary at the helm of affairs. Presently, it is Ganapthy, their general secy.

They want to dismantle the bourgeoisie–led democracy in India. They attempt to defeat the Indian state through guerilla warfare. Now they are in the stage of strategic defence. After that, they would go to the stage of strategic stalemate, before finally going into strategic offense.

Q7. The tribal villagers today feel torn between the police and maoists? How did this come about?

ANS: The Maoist movement, as I said previously, had started off in urban areas, specifically in Kolkata. Thereafter, the comrades desired to branch out in the rural areas. But that didn’t work due to mismanagement and wrong reading of the doctrinal principles of guerrilla warfare.

After 1980, the Naxal movement regained its strength. But this time it was from Andhra Pradesh. Now, they targeted the tribal zones of India in Central India and Andhra-Orissa border regions.

Once the movement gathered momentum in the Adivasi heartlands, it was natural that the tribals shall be the pawns for both the maoist guerrillas and the police.

Q8. The Maoist movement began for the people then how did it happen that the villagers also feel threatened by the moats in addition to the police?

ANS: See, it’s difficult to give a black-and-white answer to this qs. The leaders of the movement still claim that it is for the people, of the people and by the people. The people are to the guerrillas as water is to the fish.

So, never will the Maoist rebels want to be alienated from the masses.

What, however, happens is in a war zone, some villagers would necessarily be caught in the crossfire; willingly or unwillingly.

Nevertheless, is it state repression or naxal menace, which acts as a  greater threat to the ordinary Adivasi, remains a matter of debate and research.

Q9. Have the movement today become less about the people?

ANS: Again, as I just said, opinions would vary. In fact, the Naxalites of the 1960s and 70s would vouch that the movement has become bloody and less pro-people. But the present Maoists are reluctant to accept that thesis.

Q10. What are your views on how the police are currently handling the situation out in these areas?

ANS: The police are involved in counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism operations. They normally try not to antagonize the rural populace. But the history of police forces in India is abysmal. Endemic corruption and political interference has marred the credibility of police forces in India.

Q11. Do you think the government and the police are justified in their actions? Or do you think the maoists are justified in their actions?

ANS: Again, we need to appreciate that this is a civil war. And in a war, atrocities are committed by both parties. However, that does not exonerate either party.

Q12. How does one expect the adivasis and the tribals in these regions to survive and fight the heavily armed government and the maoists?

ANS: Now, we need to understand that there are always NOT three parties to this war. I mean: not always the division of the war zone into Adivasis, Maoists and Security forces.

A clear-cut division is not always discernible. But those Adivasis who want to remain free of the fight against the state, join the state as either ‘informers’ or pump up the fight against the Maoists as militia in  the form of Salwa Judum (in Chhattisgarh). Very recenty, Supreme Court of India has banned the Salwa Judum militia.

Q13. How do the Maoists fund themselves for their operations and equipments? Do they have external links and support?

ANS: Their main sources of funding are:

a. internal revenue collection from the Adivasis and the backward classes in the zones which have been ‘liberated’ from the Indian govt.

b. extortion from the MNCs which try to set up businesses in the liberated zones.

c. They also steal the equipments and ammunitions from the police, after an ambush/raid is successful.

There are always possibilities/allegations that the Indian Maoists may have external links/support; e.g from Nepal, China, Phillipines and even cross-border terrorists in Pakistan. However, no substantial proof have been posited as of yet.

In fact, WikiLeaks dismisses such link-ups; though even that assertion is NOT beyond doubt.

http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=715&u_id=136

Q14. What have been the various government approaches to tackle the maoists over the past few years?  And how have the maoists and the people reacted to it?

ANS: Indian govt’s approach has been two-pronged:

a.   Development      &          b. police-cum-paramilitary operations.

The Maoists have reacted sharply; continuing with their guerrilla war. The people have either joined the Maoists or the govt. or remained neutral.

A tribal militia called Salwa Judum was also set up to tackle the civil war. It has been banned by the Supreme Court.

Q15. What and how do you foresee the future for this movement?

ANS: As per my analysis, the Maoist movement would continue to flourish in the tribal/backward regions till governance could be restored there.

Since this is a low-intensity conflict, it shall continue for quite a number of years to come. Another 10 - 15 years of sustained fight could probably see the movement splurge into the Indian cities.

Till that happens, the Indian Maoists would be in no formidable position to challenge the might of the Indian state.

Q16. Are peace talks even possible today?

ANS: Peace talks took place in Andhra Pradesh in 2004. Didn’t work out. Even of late (2011, 14^th November’s news); the Maoists have spurned the offer of negotiations from the Chief Minister of West Bengal.

More thought on this could be gained from here:

http://www.udayindia.org/content_12march2011/cover_story.html

http://udayindia.org/content_21august2010/cover_story.html

Q17. The rich will continue to exploit the masses and the government will continue to support them. Where and how do you see this headed?

ANS: Well, this is true in many cases, but not always and outrightly. India basically suffers from the malaise of corruption. Democratic movements have shot up to counter such mal-administration. Naxal ideology could be seen as one of the forms of protestations.

For a heterogeneous country like India, disparities are bound to exist and no magic-wand seem to emerge in the foreseeable future.

Q18. The feeling is that, if there is anything else that the Indian government does not want the world to know about besides Kashmir is the Maoists movement. Comment?

ANS: Well, why only the Maoist movement, no democratic polity would like to expose its weaknesses. And India always has maintained the position of not interfering in other country’s internal problems and hence expects the same from others.

Q19. What according to you are the main problems and the solution to this long violent struggle?

ANS: As I have already said, there are no magic solutions. Problems have been already discussed, I presume.

However, the govt. ought to proceed with its winning hearts and minds counter-insurgency programme coupled with the targeted killings/incarcerations of the top Maoist leaders. That could provide dividends in the long run.

Q20. The middle class across the country seem to be ignorant about this issue and even if they are aware they seem to just brush this aside as another atrocity which they do not want to hear of (given that the media only feeds them information in bits and pieces so that they are not able to get a complete picture and hence kept in the dark)? Why do you think the middle class behave in this manner? What can be done to make them aware and question the information that is fed to them by the government and the media?

ANS: It’s a wrong assumption that the media news is mostly fed by the Indian state. Rather, the middle class is open to news from all sections.

However, it would be callow to expect the burgeoning Indian middle class to venture out of their confines of comfort in the cities and nourish the Adivasis. 

Till, as I said, the insurgency hits the cities in a big manner, the middle class won’t be shaken from their comfort zones.