"In one muhalla alone, Kucha Chelan, some 1,400 citizens of Delhi were cut down. 'The orders went out to shoot every soul', recorded Edward Vibart, a nineteen-year-old British officer."
- William Dalrymple, The Last Mughal p4, Penguin Random House India, 2007
29-03-2020 will be a Sunday. 29th March 1857 too was a Sunday.
History is a commentary on the lives of people and societies as drawn from the received data, opines Ashin Das Gupta in his rather slim yet dense manuscript 'History and Literature'.
He further elaborates that History as a social science is now widely accepted; however there is a reluctance to look upon History as Literature. Amusingly though, Das Gupta informs that in World History Congress in San Francisco in the late 1970s, some Soviet historians rather ironically criticised the western social scientists 'for trending the social scientific approach of History writing'.
History is a commentary on the lives of people and societies as drawn from the received data, opines Ashin Das Gupta in his rather slim yet dense manuscript 'History and Literature'.
He further elaborates that History as a social science is now widely accepted; however there is a reluctance to look upon History as Literature. Amusingly though, Das Gupta informs that in World History Congress in San Francisco in the late 1970s, some Soviet historians rather ironically criticised the western social scientists 'for trending the social scientific approach of History writing'.
Bias is inherent and endemic in
history writing. Any narration, for that matter history to be specific, is composed through the prism of the historian. Yes, as Partha
Chatterjee writes that history is not fiction, surely, yet proclivities of the
historian are embedded in the narration itself. To interpret is the job of the
historian – if not duty. However before one interprets; piecing together data,
evidence, facts is the quintessential function.
‘Unbiased’ data and facts – is
it possible to have them? If one lends credence to E H Carr, the basic database in
itself is supposed to contain seeds of contamination. Then up to which depth is
the historian supposed to delve into? Will the narrator/interpreter have the
privilege to conduct first hand interviews of the actors? In some cases, it may
be possible, based on certain factors, viz. administrative and logistic, among
others and depending on the timeline up to which the research dates back. In
most cases, however, it would not be practicable.
Nevertheless, Das Gupta may be quoted once again:
"Social Science is pushing history writing towards the impersonal turning to the crowd and ignoring the individual, the popular attraction for literature is pulling the historian to the study of human beings..."
British historian Richard Cobb argued that history is about specific individuals. In fact, according to Das Gupta, 'Cobb endeavoured to demonstrate how the French Revolution could be understood from a detailed analysis of the experiences of the specific individuals caught in its vortex'.
Even Ernst Fischer writes in the defence of Karl Marx, who has been claimed by historians as well as non-historians to be the proponent of turning the study of history as a social science - and relegating the role of the human being to the back-burner, and as Fischer opines, has remained mostly misunderstood by academia as well as the common masses that Marx never abandoned his theoretical position on the relationship between 'man' and history since his opinion expressed in The Holy Family :
"History does nothing.......It is man, real living man, that possesses and fights....history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims"
It is germane to cite verbatim what Karl Marx wrote on the philosophy of history in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) :
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under the circumstances chosen by themselves, but under the circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."
The Mutiny Papers
The Letters, Despatches and Other State papers of the Military Department of the Government of India pertaining to 1857-58, edited by George W. Forrest assume monumental importance in this context. Chapter 1 of Volume one of the documents provides a fresh insight into the genesis of the rebellion of 1857. Interestingly, major historical discourses have hardly highlighted this phase of the mutiny and mostly concentrated on the beginning of the mutiny on the late afternoon of Sunday, 29 March 1857 when an otherwise quiet Barrackpore cantonment in the suburbs of Calcutta [now Kolkata] woke up to the shouts of a soldier of the 34th Native Infantry:
“Come
out, you bhainchutes, the Europeans are here!........
……..It’s for our religion…..
You have incited me to do this……”
Whether Mangal Pandey or Mungul Pandy as
his name was spelled by the colonial officers, was under the influence of bhang or
not hardly makes any difference as far as effects of the rebellion are concerned. The discussion on his state of mind and health may only be relevant
to the historiography of 1857-8.
However, the point of focus over here
is that Rudrangshu Mukherjee in his monograph ‘Mangal Pandey – brave martyr or
accidental hero’, sets up the event on that fateful Sunday of 29 March by
referring to imperialist historiographer John Kaye’s scenic description of the
serenity close to the banks of the Hooghly River at Barrackpore cantonment.
It is germane to stress on the words
allegedly spoken by Pandey on 29 March :
“You have incited me to do this…..”
Was he referring to his comrades of
the 34th Native Infantry? And indeed if his comrades had incited
him, then who were they? Did they plan a rebellion themselves or was there any external influence? How does one attempt to
discern these aspects after over 150 years of the actual set of events?
Forrest’s collection of papers could
aid in throwing some light on these untouched aspects of one of the greatest
events of Indian history. The doyen of Subaltern historiography, Ranajit Guha
has warned posterity and especially the historians, in his by now
cult-status holder piece ‘The Prose of Counterinsurgency’ that imperialist school of historiography
is beset with the obvious bias of being tilted toward the ruling imperial
elite, in howsoever an ‘objective’ manner they are written. With regard to Guha's perspective, narratives from Kaye and Malleson to Christopher Hibbert and Saul
David suffer from that malaise.
Though the State Papers were compiled
and edited by then ruling elite, yet they provide the ‘purest’ form of primary
source that is available to historians as on date considering the fact that the
collection is devoid of interpretations, rather contains a series of
submissions and correspondences. It may so happen that certain documents have
been ‘deliberately’ omitted or the submissions are ‘coloured’, yet with the set
of records at disposal, and with the corroborative research carried out by
imperialist as well as Nationalist, Marxist, subaltern and post-structuralist
historians, a fresh narrative can always be crafted.
23 January is a memorable day for the
Indians. It is the birthday of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. On the same day,
but precisely forty years before Netaji’s birth, a highly interesting thing happened at the
northern rim of the city, in Calcutta’s Dum-Dum area. The officer commanding the
depot of musketry wrote an official missive to the station staff officer at
Dum-Dum regarding an issue which according to him should have raised alarm
bells.
The officer J A Bontein submits that in
the evening of Thursday, 22 January, after the evening parade, as he
preferred to listen to possible grievances or complaints from the sepoys,
“At least two-thirds of the detachment immediately stepped to the
front, including all the native commissioned officers. In a manner perfectly
respectful they very distinctly stated their objection to the present method of
preparing cartridges for the new rifled musket. The mixture employed for
greasing cartridges was opposed to their religious feeling, and as a remedy
they begged to suggest the employment of wax and oil in such proportions as, in
their opinion, would answer the purpose required.”
This letter was a clear indication of
the magnitude of the problem since two-third of the detachment had grievances
regarding the greased cartridges to be used in the newly introduced Enfield
Rifles having ‘rifled bore’ and hence greasing was necessary. It is evident
that the gravity of the problem was duly measured by the Officer Commanding of
the Musketry as he concludes his letter thus:
“I have felt it my duty to bring this circumstance to the knowledge of
the officer commanding the station, and I would further request that my report
may be forwarded through the appointed channel for the consideration of his
Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.”
Bontein in his letter had referred to
an accompanying report from J A Wright, Commanding the Rifle Instruction Depot
to the Adjutant at Dum-Dum, dated 22 January 1857, in which Wright had mentioned:
“…..there appears to be a very unpleasant feeling existing among the
native soldiers who are here for instruction, regarding the grease used in
preparing the cartridges…..”
The apparently innocuous yet alarming incident
referred to in his letter by Wright was related to a certain khalasi attached
to the magazine at Dum-Dum. The (unknown) khalasi had asked a sepoy of the 2nd
Regiment, Native (Grenadier) Infantry to provide him with water from his lota (container).
But the sepoy had refused, clearly reflecting the caste-hierarchy existing in
the sub-continent during that period. The apparently disgruntled khalasi
retorted that the sepoy would ‘soon lose his caste as he would have to bite
cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows’.
Wright further informed his superior
that the sepoys/sipahis/soldiers confided to him that the news regarding the greased cartridges ‘has
spread throughout India’ like a wildfire and even if the grease is not made up
of pig and cow fat, as purportedly being told, their friends (supposedly other
sepoys) will not believe them. The soldiers in conversation with Wright further
suggested that they may be allowed to make the grease themselves so that any doubt is removed.
Wright concluded his letter by recommending
the suggestions of the soldiers in allowing them to make the grease themselves
so that ‘any misunderstanding regarding the religious prejudices of the natives
in general will be prevented’.
Incidentally, there is no
mention of the name and whereabouts of the khalasi in contention who is
supposed/alleged to be the primary link to the conflagration of 1857.
The Questions
It may also happen that the sepoys had
concocted the story of the khalasi so as to shield their actual motives in
rising against the English East India Company. Or it is quite likely that the
khalasi being the subaltern of the most insignificant category, was not
considered to be documented by the colonial masters. It was as if all khalasis
were treated equally (or unequally but similarly) but as indistinguishable
individuals. However, if the khalasi had indeed triggered the rebellion by
infusing the thought process in the mind of the caste-afflicted, religiously-prejudiced
Indian sepoy, then two questions apparently arise:
a. Did the khalasi himself frame the idea of loss of caste for
the sepoys and in the process acted as an agent in igniting the dialectical
process in history? If yes, then was the news related to the grease a reality?
Or
Or
b. Was the khalasi being used by some external agents and
naturally expected not to have any consciousness of his own?
Even if
the khalasi framed the idea of loss of caste on his own based on the substance used
in the grease, which he obviously could, that might have been based on some
hearsay, if not reality because the actual content of the grease was never
brought to the fore and like the khalasi, has remained outside the realm of
historical documentation.
Could
there be external agents inciting the rebellion by 'poisoning' the minds of the
sepoys? Such a possibility did exist. Major-General Hearsey, commanding the
Presidency Division at Barrackpore, in his letter dated 28 January 1857 to
Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army expressed that in all likelihood “the
Brahmins or agents of the religious Hindu party in Calcutta (the ‘Dhurma
Subha’)” are spreading the rumour that the sepoys would be coerced to embrace Christianity.
It is
important in this regard to refer to what Benoy Ghosh has to write:
“In the beginning of 1857, the whole society was in ferment
in Bengal. The orthodox Hindus and the general mass of ignorant and
superstitious people got alarmed at the spectacular successes of the reformers.
The citadel of orthodox Hinduism was now actually on the point of collapse. Some
of its massive pillars were being pulled down one by one by Rammohan, the
Derozians, the Brahmo Sabhaites and the Vidyasagarites. The Dharma Sabhaites
looked upon this as nothing but a conspiracy of the British rulers and their
agents, the missionaries, to convert the entire people to Chiristianity by
subverting their own religion.”
Ghosh further informs that ‘brilliant young men of the day like Krishnamohan Banerjee (of the Young Bengal movement) and the famous poet Madhusudan Dutt were converted to Christianity’ thereby denting the prestige of the respectable families of Calcutta. Even the authorities of the Hindu College (later Presidency College) raised alarm. The fear of ‘conversion to Christianity’ had caught a feverish mood among the entire spectrum of the elites of Calcutta in the 1840s and 50s, writes Ghosh. The situation appeared so problematic that the liberal Brahmo Sabha planned to forge a united alliance with their ideological counterparts, the conservative Dharma Sabha, under the umbrella of the Tattvabodhini Sabha of Debendra Nath Tagore (father of Nobel laureate Rabindra Nath Tagore).
A view of
the opposite polarity is worth noting here. Crispin Bates and Marina Carter in their chapter titled Holy Warriors published in a series of studies (Mutiny at the Margins) on the events during 1857-8 mention
Coopland’s opinion that ‘as this is completely a Mahomedan rising, there is not
much to be feared from the Hindoos of Benares, who are, moreover, cowardly,
unwarlike Bengalees’.
Similarly,
Ghosh cites the Hindoo Patriot of 4 June 1857 that ‘the Bengalees never aspired
to the glory of leading armies to battle…….their pursuits and their triumphs
are entirely civil.’
With all it’s
allegedly emasculated image nevertheless, the Bengali dominated Dharma Sabha
still had the potential to ignite the fire among the sepoys – the inevitable
backbone of the organism called the Company, as the Hindoo Patriot avers:
“A strong and versatile intellect enables them [Bengalees]
to think deeply and to think farsightedly…..”
And it
surely required no great thinking that a caste-conscious and religion-sensitive
Bengal Regiment had the potential to explode if the ‘story’ of the cow and pig
fat laden grease was somehow spread. It may not be simply a coincidence that the
ignition took place at Dum-Dum, territorially in close proximity to Shovabazar
in north Calcutta, the residence of Raja Radhakanta Deb, the founder of Dharma
Sabha in 1829.
The Sabha
was founded as a reaction against the liberalizing forces of Brahmo Sabha by
Rammohan Roy et al. and especially the overt radicalism of Henry Derozio
through his Young Bengal movement. No doubt, the prohibition of Sati in 1829 was
the immediate cause for the conservative elites of Calcutta to huddle under the
umbrella of Dharma Sabha (connoting that Hindu Dharma was in danger from both
within as well as without and hence its revival and re-establishment was
necessary through an organisation), it seems rather implausible that prohibition
of Sati could have been a raison d’être for igniting the rebellion through the
modus operandi of spreading the ‘rumour’, if at all, of the substance used in
the grease.
Similar inference has been drawn by Andrea Major as she alludes to Ainslee Embree’s mentioning of the 1850 Act that made it possible for converts to Christianity to retain their inheritance and inherit ancestral property which caused widespread resentment among the Indians than the prohibition of Sati brought in almost three decades ago. [Mutiny at the Margins, Vol 1, pp 43 - 60, ed Crispin Bates, SAGE publications, 2013]
Similar inference has been drawn by Andrea Major as she alludes to Ainslee Embree’s mentioning of the 1850 Act that made it possible for converts to Christianity to retain their inheritance and inherit ancestral property which caused widespread resentment among the Indians than the prohibition of Sati brought in almost three decades ago. [Mutiny at the Margins, Vol 1, pp 43 - 60, ed Crispin Bates, SAGE publications, 2013]
Toward
the beginning of 1857, there existed an overall atmosphere of fear of being
converted to Christianity. Such a thesis
holds firm ground as Benoy Ghosh refers to Syed Ahmed Khan (one of the key
witnesses to the 1857 revolt) that the Christian missionaries frequented
mosques and temples and preached their religion, and in certain districts they
had the luxury of being escorted by a policeman of the thana – ostensibly flexing
the administrative muscle that definitely aided their proselytizing activities
and consequently exacerbated the fear among the Indian population. After all,
it was through the Charter Act of 1813 that the Christian missionaries made
their way into India and by 1856-7, a series of legislation from Sati to Widow
remarriage had been passed by the colonial-utilitarian government. Moreover,
the government of Dalhousie and/or Canning did nothing to assuage the
prevailing apprehension. It was thus not unnatural for the population to think
that religious persecution would soon reach its pre-designed climax and before
the missionaries could be successful in their insidious machinations, it was
incumbent upon the religious/conservative elite to hit at the nerve centre of
the Company Raj – the Bengal Army.
From the
24 Pargannas North, where Barrackpore is located, for the time being our
narrative would have to shift its location to Raniganj – about 200 km away from
Kolkata, in the Paschim Bardhaman district of today’s West Bengal. Could it be a mere coincidence, as Major-General Hearsey
asked in his letter to Mathew, that the bungalow belonging to a sergeant at
‘Raneegunge’ was burnt down by an incendiary. Interestingly, at that point of
time, according to the words of Hearsey, Raniganj housed a wing of the 2nd
Regiment, Native (Grenadier) Infantry – the same regiment whose sepoy was
allegedly derided by the khalasi at Dum-Dum for the prospect of losing his caste, few days back.
As if to
clearly cast the spells of the bad omen and impending violence, there were
three incendiary fires at Barrackpore in a span of four days between 22nd
and 27th January, reports Hearsey. And one of the fires was at the
electric telegraph bungalow – an idea which by all reasonable probability ought
to have shot from a tactical mind with a strategic-cum-military vision.
Further,
definite signal of synchronized activity by an active group of mutineers could
be deciphered from what Hearsey continues to aver:
“…..Chamier of 34th Regiment, Native Infantry,
having taken a lighted arrow from the thatch of his own Bungalow – has confirmed
in my mind that this incendiarism is caused by ill-affected men, who wish thus
to make known or spread a spirit of discontent, and induce the sepoys to
believe they are all laboring under some grievances…..”
Niladri
Chatterji in his doctoral dissertation refers to the submission of Indian
police officer Moinuddin Hasan Khan that ‘burning of telegraph office would
immediately be communicated along the line from Calcutta to Punjab, rapidly
spreading the news of the arson attacks to other sepoy regiments stationed
across northern India.’
In the
wake of these incidents, the Company deemed it expedient to conduct a Special
Court of Inquiry at Barrackpore on 06 February 1857, duly presided by Colonel S
G Wheler of 34th Regiment, Native Infantry. As many as ten witnesses
(sepoys) were summoned. None of the witnesses could posit with clarity the
exactitude of the problem regarding the greased cartridge to be used in the
Enfield Rifle. Fundamentally, they referred to ‘bazar reports’ that there was
‘some fat in the paper (making the cartridges)’.
For
instance, Havildar Bheekun Khan could not discuss the contentious issue of cow
and pig fat allegedly being used in the greased cartridges with his officer
since it was ‘merely a bazaar report’. Bheekun’s submission point towards an
interesting position – though the sepoys might have treated the ‘cow and pig’
story as a rumour, yet a considerable trust deficit existed between the sepoys
and the military administration so that the soldiers somehow could not accept the official position at face value.
Havildar-Major
Ajoodiah Singh’s testimony on the other hand indicates peer pressure on him. Though he was rational enough to subject the cartridge paper to few tests
in oil and water and then arrive at the conclusion that ‘there was no grease in
it’, yet on the other hand he was reluctant to bite off the cartridge since by doing
it, “the other men would object to it”.
One
witness Chand Khan of the 7th Company, 2nd Regiment,
Native (Grenadier) Infantry continued to oppose the use of the paper saying
that ‘everyone is dissatisfied with it on account of it being glazed, shining
like wax-cloth’, even though he agreed in front of the committee that there was
no smell of grease in the cartridge paper after a paper was burnt in the court
itself. Jemadar Buddun Singh too expressed his discomfiture at the cartridge
paper. Jemadar Ram Singh of the 2nd Regiment, Native (Grenadier)
Infantry referred to the magazine khalasis in Calcutta from whom he thought the
report about the grease had spread.
According to Ram Singh, there could have been a number of khalasis, who reported the news related to the greased cartridges. In fact, it is quite natural that if one khalasi knew or spread the information, his comrades, at least some of them would also be privy to it.
More militant was Jemadar Golaub Khan of the 2nd Company, 2nd Regiment, Native (Grenadier) Infantry. He raised objection to the paper, since according to him, there was a report about grease in the paper. He further asserted that he was sure that there was grease in the paper since the new cartridge paper was different from the earlier one.
Though Jemadars Gunnes Singh and Wuzeer Khan expressed no objection to the cartridge, yet both testified that there were reports of a suspicious grease in it.
The Answers
Certainly Mangal Pandey was not the only one - may be alone on 29th March 1857 to have struck against the Company Raj - though apart from Shaikh Paltu, none resisted him.
On Friday, the 6th of February, 1857, at about 7 PM in the evening, Lt A S Allen was sitting in the verandah of his bungalow, when a soldier intimated him of a plot amongst the sepoys 'of either plundering or burning down the bungalows at Barrackpore'. The seopoy further told him that the soldiers planned to proceed to Calcutta and attempt to seize Fort William, or failing that, to take possession of the Treasury.
The soldier also said that the burning down of the electric telegraph office was part of a concerted plan to prevent the Government receiving speedy information. The sepoy was identified to be Ramsahai Lalla.
Jemadar Durrio of the 8th Company, 34th Regiment, Native Infantry too had solemnly affirmed that on the night of 5th February 1857, two or three men (sepoys) went to his residence and goaded him to accompany to the parade ground where a larger gathering was waiting to eke out a plan for mutiny.
Even Dalrymple, being a celebrated historian as he is, asks a childlike question in the Introduction to his bestselling book 'The Last Mughal' - "If Mangal Pandey was the sepoys' inspiration, they certainly did not articulate it, nor did they rush towards Barrackpore or Calcutta." [last paragraph of p20, The Last Mughal, 2013, Penguin]
By raising such a query, he is exhibiting a condescending perception about the intellectual capacity of the rebels. For sure, the rebel soldiers would move towards the capital of Hindustan and not toward the British strong-house of Calcutta. That was the simple logic. And Pandey's rebellion was probably a singular outburst not in sync with the overall plan. Pandey possibly missed the date and time of the mutiny. By no means however, it was a spontaneous and isolated move by a disgruntled soldier, far less a cacophony of an inebriated individual. The larger plan, and the rebellious backdrop in which Pandey took the centre-stage on the 29th of March 1857 is discernible by piecing together historical data.
In what form would the sepoys 'articulate' the contribution of Pandey during the rebellion, Mr Dalrymple? Are they expected to pen panegyrics on him during the course of the revolt or chant 'Jai Mangal' instead of uttering 'Din'?
Pandey was one among many sepoys who were working out the details of the attack against the Company. He was one of the comrades - just that on 29th March he burst out first whereas the others were still not sure to join the bandwagon - which ultimately happened on the Sunday of 10th May at Meerut.
Though fiercely debated among historians, yet March 29, 1857 was far from being an apocryphal day in the history of Modern India insofar as the uprising of 1857 is concerned. Havildar Shaikh Pultoo of the 34th Regiment, Native Infantry in his official submission later was unsure if Mangal Pandey was under the infuence of bhaang, since he was a regular bhaang-taker (taking intoxicating drinks and visiting prostitutes were not uncommon among sepoys).
But underestimating Pandey's leonine demeanour on 29th March 1857 would be a historical blunder. The Company felt the tremors as Pandey roared :
"Come out, you bhainchutes, the Europeans are here. From biting these cartridges, we shall become infidels. Get ready, turn out all of you."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Ram Singh, there could have been a number of khalasis, who reported the news related to the greased cartridges. In fact, it is quite natural that if one khalasi knew or spread the information, his comrades, at least some of them would also be privy to it.
More militant was Jemadar Golaub Khan of the 2nd Company, 2nd Regiment, Native (Grenadier) Infantry. He raised objection to the paper, since according to him, there was a report about grease in the paper. He further asserted that he was sure that there was grease in the paper since the new cartridge paper was different from the earlier one.
Though Jemadars Gunnes Singh and Wuzeer Khan expressed no objection to the cartridge, yet both testified that there were reports of a suspicious grease in it.
The Answers
Certainly Mangal Pandey was not the only one - may be alone on 29th March 1857 to have struck against the Company Raj - though apart from Shaikh Paltu, none resisted him.
On Friday, the 6th of February, 1857, at about 7 PM in the evening, Lt A S Allen was sitting in the verandah of his bungalow, when a soldier intimated him of a plot amongst the sepoys 'of either plundering or burning down the bungalows at Barrackpore'. The seopoy further told him that the soldiers planned to proceed to Calcutta and attempt to seize Fort William, or failing that, to take possession of the Treasury.
The soldier also said that the burning down of the electric telegraph office was part of a concerted plan to prevent the Government receiving speedy information. The sepoy was identified to be Ramsahai Lalla.
Jemadar Durrio of the 8th Company, 34th Regiment, Native Infantry too had solemnly affirmed that on the night of 5th February 1857, two or three men (sepoys) went to his residence and goaded him to accompany to the parade ground where a larger gathering was waiting to eke out a plan for mutiny.
Even Dalrymple, being a celebrated historian as he is, asks a childlike question in the Introduction to his bestselling book 'The Last Mughal' - "If Mangal Pandey was the sepoys' inspiration, they certainly did not articulate it, nor did they rush towards Barrackpore or Calcutta." [last paragraph of p20, The Last Mughal, 2013, Penguin]
By raising such a query, he is exhibiting a condescending perception about the intellectual capacity of the rebels. For sure, the rebel soldiers would move towards the capital of Hindustan and not toward the British strong-house of Calcutta. That was the simple logic. And Pandey's rebellion was probably a singular outburst not in sync with the overall plan. Pandey possibly missed the date and time of the mutiny. By no means however, it was a spontaneous and isolated move by a disgruntled soldier, far less a cacophony of an inebriated individual. The larger plan, and the rebellious backdrop in which Pandey took the centre-stage on the 29th of March 1857 is discernible by piecing together historical data.
In what form would the sepoys 'articulate' the contribution of Pandey during the rebellion, Mr Dalrymple? Are they expected to pen panegyrics on him during the course of the revolt or chant 'Jai Mangal' instead of uttering 'Din'?
Pandey was one among many sepoys who were working out the details of the attack against the Company. He was one of the comrades - just that on 29th March he burst out first whereas the others were still not sure to join the bandwagon - which ultimately happened on the Sunday of 10th May at Meerut.
Though fiercely debated among historians, yet March 29, 1857 was far from being an apocryphal day in the history of Modern India insofar as the uprising of 1857 is concerned. Havildar Shaikh Pultoo of the 34th Regiment, Native Infantry in his official submission later was unsure if Mangal Pandey was under the infuence of bhaang, since he was a regular bhaang-taker (taking intoxicating drinks and visiting prostitutes were not uncommon among sepoys).
But underestimating Pandey's leonine demeanour on 29th March 1857 would be a historical blunder. The Company felt the tremors as Pandey roared :
"Come out, you bhainchutes, the Europeans are here. From biting these cartridges, we shall become infidels. Get ready, turn out all of you."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
