Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Article No. 2281
http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=1282&u_id=136
On 15 December 2012, Reuters reported that
the government of “Philippines declared an 18-day
unilateral Christmas truce with its Maoist guerrillas, in part to focus on
relief efforts in Mindanao (a southern island), devastated by a typhoon”. [1]
It has been
around two years since the peace talks had commenced between the guerrillas and
the government. But the talks were stalled over
a rebel demand for the release of prisoners and the government's natural
insistence that the rebels stop extortion – a crucial pillar for the economic
sustenance of the ultras.
In a 14 February 2011 report, the
International Crisis Group (ICG) did not dither to predict that in Philippines,
neither the Communist insurgents nor the ruling regime will win the ongoing war
“militarily”. ICG had and by reasonable probability still has certain
fundamental reasons to stand firm on its argument.
The present political dispensation, headed
by the President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III, decided to revive negotiations with
the Communist Party of Philippines [CPP] and its armed unit New People’s Army
[NPA] in October 2010. In fact, that was not for the first time that a Filipino
government decided to hold talks with the ultra left-wingers. About two decades
back, in the 1990s, during the period of Valdez Ramos – the 12th
President, talks were held with the rebels.
Interestingly, the CPP-NPA, under the
colourful Jose Maria Sison based in Utrecht, Netherlands, believes that the
party would be reaching Strategic Stalemate - the second phase of Guerrilla
Warfare – by 2015. Similar thought came to the minds of the ultras in the 1980s
and the resultant was that they were almost on the verge of being decimated through
internal purges and external onslaught by the security forces.
The
Beginnings
The present insurgency began in the
historic year of 1967-8 – when not only the South Asian people were clamouring,
but even Europe and Latin America were claiming ‘change’. An ambience of
resistance swept all through the globe. As Che-guevara was being hunted down
within the confines of land-locked Bolivia and Mao Tse-tung voiced his concerns
(regarding revisionism creeping into the domain of Communism) through the
controversial Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, guns were taken up by a
section of the populace in erstwhile colonies of European countries. Philippines
were one. India was another.
And interestingly, both the countries, are
still witnessing the two movements which commenced almost in parallel – at the
same time, only separated spatially.
The present scenario reads thus: the
southern island of Mindanao in Philippines mirrors the central Indian district
of Bastar in terms of the focal point of the communist insurgency. Both CPP and
the Communist Party of India – Maoist [CPI-M] generate revenues through
revolutionary taxes on business houses; be it the plantations or the mining
corporations as the case and chance may be.
Modi
Operandi
NPA operates from the border areas of the
provinces, so as to attack in many directions – a pattern very similar to that adopted
by the Indian Maoists. Both the outfits strongly believe in Mao’s theory of
Protracted People’s War [PPW] with the peasantry spearheading the movement.
Both adopt a centralised strategic leadership with decentralised operations –
that is, considerable independence at the field levels.
The NPA too goes for agawarmas – that is, seizure of weapons through ambushes, something
which is at times exceedingly daily-event like in the Maoist dominated areas of
India. Both the groups consistently carry out Targeted Killing of tribal
leaders and other “informants”. Pangayaw or
tribal wars go on with impunity in the insurgency affected areas of Philippines.
Similarly, in the state of Chattisgarh in India, till recently, Salwa Judum was a well-known term.
Even as one looks at the growth trajectory
of these two insurgencies, lots of similarities emerge. NPA had undergone multitudes
of ups and downs in its history of over four decades. Counterinsurgency
campaigns by the Filipino government alongwith internal splits and purges were
the chief reasons in the mid 1980s to handicap the CPP. The NPA, too, lost many
of its armed cadres in the process and presently has an estimated 5,000
fighters. At the other end, the estimated strength of the People’s Liberation
Guerrilla Army [PLGA] of the CPI-M is somewhere between 10,000 to 25,000.
The
Commonalities
CPI-M and CPP have had strenuous periods of
internal bickering, splits, mergers, further splits and re-mergers. The major
ideological and contentious issues for the development of fissures in CPP were:
·
Difference in opinion in
adopting the “correct” Strategy and Tactics
·
Which to start first – rural or
urban guerrilla warfare?
·
What should be the party
hierarchy like? Whether to focus on Top-Down centralisation or favour more decentralisation?
A peep into the history of the
Naxalite-Maoist movement in India since 1967-8 till today clearly shows that
the present CPI-M was formed in 2004 after innumerable splits and internecine
gory battles through 1980s and 1990s [2]. And the basic reasons for those
splits were the vacillation amongst the leadership in adopting the future
course of action. There was even a stage when the Indian Maoists were divided
into “pro and anti Lin Piao” factions.
Interestingly, it was in 2004 itself, that the
talks between the CPP and the Philippines government broke down and then President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo decided to unleash the counter-insurgency campaign. Finally,
in December 2010, the CPP-NPA declared to be in the phase of Strategic Defense
and agreed to engage in ‘peace talks’ with the Aquino government, brokered by
the Norwegians.
Most of the leaders of CPP and as well as
CPI-M are in their 60s and 70s. Both Ganapathy and Sison might like to see an
end to the decades old conflict in their lifetimes. Though Sison’s intention
may be to see the end through peace talks, as of now, Ganapathy is yet to
exhibit that intent. The ‘unexpected’ may happen if the olive branch is
extended to the latter. It could as well be the fact that both Ganapathy and
Sison would keep on using the instrument of “talks” as a tactical weapon in
this ongoing PPW.
There is, nonetheless, a distinct
difference between the two insurgencies in contention – as seen through the
prism of the counterinsurgent.
Though the Filipino government has directly
used the military in suppressing the rebellion, India has been coy in doing
that. It may well be remembered that in Operation Steeplechase in the 1970s –
unleashed to decimate the erstwhile Naxalite movement, the Army was indeed
used. It needs to be noted, however, that the Army basically encircled the
insurgent hotbeds while the actual search and destroy operations were carried
out by the paramilitary and the police.
Even after 2004 – when the Maoist
insurgency in India really shaped up with renewed vigour – and till date, the
Army has not been deployed in direct combat operations. It is true that an Army
training unit has been set up in the heart of the insurgency at Bastar, but
that is more psychological than operational.
Perspective
of the Counterinsurgent
The counterinsurgency [COIN] doctrine that
the Filipino Army uses is an admixture of Winning Hearts and Minds [WHAM]
policy plus civil militia approach to separate the insurgent from the populace
and to gather knowledge of the local terrain. The Indian approach to COIN –
though undeclared in explicit form – is based upon similar techniques. The
Civil militia part is legitimised through the induction of local youth into the
constabulary. Furthermore, a methodology of targeting the top brass has been
put into effective use in the last couple of years.
In this respect, the Special Task Force
[STF] and the Special Intelligence Branch [SIB] have worked efficiently. This
approach has in fact, crippled the Indian Maoists as they have lost “eminent”
members of their Politburo and Central Military Commission; viz. Cherukuri Rajkumar,
Koteswar Rao and Sande Rajamouli. As South Asia Terrorism Portal [SATP] informs,
presently 13 Politburo and Central Committee members are behind the bars. [3]
Another palpable difference between the two
insurgencies is the obvious – the Filipino movement is relatively at rest as on-off
“talks” keep on going whereas the Indian Maoist movement is reported to have
bloody skirmishes almost regularly. In the period of 2005 – 2012, the total
number of casualties is close to 6,000 [4]. The CPI-M is reluctant to put down
arms till the Indian counterinsurgents declare a unilateral ceasefire – a
highly asymmetrical demand in this irregular war!
At this juncture, what could be the
trajectories of solutions for the Indian counterinsurgent? Is the Filipino
counterinsurgent proceeding in the right track by negotiating with the rebels?
There is no denial of the basic fact that
the support of the population has to be with the counterinsurgent. If not, then
at least the “sea” of population should not supply nutrients to the rebel
“fish”. This is a maxim not only relevant from Mao’s perspective, but is also reflected
through David Galula’s writings. For that, WHAM-based approach appears to be
most feasible. Thus a ‘Clear’ operation must not be accompanied with only the
‘Hold’ follow-up, but the ‘Build’ phase with credible governance must be pumped
into the rural heartlands without delay.
On a tactical level, the Targeted
Imprisonment of the top leadership may go on unabated – gaining credible
intelligence which can be further corroborated from the local level spy network
established in the villages – which can only be created if the WHAM approach is
carried on. In this connection of the ancillary Targeted approach,
Superintendent of Police of the Koria district in Chattisgarh, Dhruv Gupta, has
an interesting argument. His paper in the 2011 April-June edition of the Indian
Police Journal clearly profess “nabbing the top leaders and plugging the supply
routes from the urban areas” for the Maoists as an alternative to pumping more
and more paramilitary forces to win the rural hinterlands. He advises the
police to concentrate on their ‘strong points’ rather than unnecessarily trying
to mend their weaker areas.
At the operational level, small-unit fast
paced precision strikes could be implemented instead of the company level area
domination searches. In fact, small-unit operations were highly successful in
the counterinsurgency operations in Malaysia in the 1950s under the command of Harold
Briggs. The concept ultimately tipped the war in favour of the British.
Initially, the British counterinsurgents were relying on massed attacks on the
fluid insurgents without discernible success.
Nothing happens without on-ground
preparedness. “Cloning” Greyhounds and Cobras, as advocated by John D M Mitra
[5], could be vital in the ongoing campaign against the CPI-M. However, the
joint forces need to be led by the state police as it is only the latter which
possesses the local knowledge.
Conclusions
For the above to fructify, a
well-documented Counter-insurgency Manual by the Police would be a firm step in
the right direction. Gone would be the days of ad-hocism. Standard Operating
Procedures would be embedded into the manual – not a be all “dogmatic text”, but
at least a strategic space to think and act decisively.
As far as India’s eastern counterpart is
concerned, Manila is probably throwing its weight behind the peace talks not
only just for the sake of it or for historical reasons. Manila has very
recently come to an agreement with the Moro separatist insurgency and hence
desires an equivalent outcome with the leftist ultras.
Two things, however, Manila may do well to
remember. It is always better to talk to communist insurgents from a position
of strength. Moreover, ‘third’ party interference in talks is better avoided.
One may never know though, with the Moro insurgency subsiding, Manila can also take
a cue from Colombo and go all out against the communist guerrillas.
A close watch on both these insurgencies in
India and Philippines is thus specially warranted. And with the reports of
Filipino Maoists aiding their Indian counterparts surfacing [6], such
microscopic monitoring becomes more than relevant.
References:
1: “Philippines declares unilateral Christmas truce with Maoists”, Reuters, Dec 15, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/15/us-philippines-maoists-idUSBRE8BE03Q20121215
2: Jairus Banaji , “The ironies of Indian Maoism”, International Socialism, Issue 128, 14 Oct 2010, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=684
3:
South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/CPI-Maoist_Politburo.htm
4:
South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/fatalitiesnaxal05-11.htm]
