29 September, 2010

Pashtuns to Gonds: Protestors or Insurgents?

by Uddipan Mukherjee


Abstract: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is of the opinion that the Maoist-'infested' heartland of India poses the biggest internal security threat to the country. However, he and a section of the government admit that the problem runs deep. The Maoist intellectuals were able to foment unrest in the Adivasi areas due to the socio-economic deprivation and lack of governance. Nevertheless, it is imperative for the administration to put the house in order through Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

This paper looks into the various options available to the authorities in that regard. Presently, India is following a diluted version of the COIN as being implemented by the US in Afghanistan. India may also emulate the successful Sri Lankan model or the Columbian approach against the FARC rebels.

However, the difficult part is the extrication of the autochthonous Adivasi from the Maoist matrix.



Tribal Movements in India: A very brief History

Anthropologist and historian K Suresh Singh asserts: “tribal communities revolted more often and far more violently than any other community including peasants in India”[1]. Furthermore, to quote Swapan Dasgupta of the Subaltern School, “too often, the independence and initiative of the dominated peoples in their social action and ideas have been either hidden in the writing of history or condescendingly marginalized.”[2]

Among the numerous tribal revolts in British India, few stand out. The Santhal ‘hool’ was one of them. In 1855-56, the Santhals, living between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal, rose in revolt against the dikus or outsiders. Their courageous insurrection was brutally crushed by the British Army [3]

While providing anecdotal evidence of tribal uprisings, it shall be difficult not to underscore Birsa Munda’s Ulgulan or Great Tumult in the region south of Ranchi in 1899-1900 [4]. Birsa’s hymns of hate against the then Europeans and the Thikadars still reverberates; albeit on a different octave.

Apart from these, the Chenchu revolt in the Nallamalai Hills (1898), the upsurge of the Oraons of Chotanagpur (1914) and the fituri led by Alluri Sitarama Raju (1922-24) were also significant [5].

Interestingly, it may not be pure coincidence that Bastar today is a highly restive region. It is home to the Gonds, the largest tribal group in India (about 7.4 million). In fact, the British feared a general Gond uprising along the Eastern Ghats so far as Kalahandi and Bastar and hence went about burning their villages.[6]


A New Turn?

The tribal revolts have not shown any marked signs of abatement even in independent India. The ingredients fomenting a tribal insurgency are extant. In addition to those, a few more diabolical ingredients have evolved since the nation-state opened up in terms of economy in a post 1991 world. Inter alia, the corporate takeover of mineral-rich landmass in the Indian hinterland is supposed to be a major cause of the recent radicalization and consequent militarization of the adivasi insurrection. Rampant infiltration in the tribal domain by the Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) aided and abetted by the state machinery without any commensurate wergeld provided to the ‘sons of the soil’ have led to their marginalization.

A feeling of lack of empowerment and lack of effective governance from ‘above’, compounded with appalling poverty has given rise to belligerence amongst a considerable section of the tribal populace in India.


The Adivasis

In the Indian context, the word Adivasi connotes the original and
autochthonous inhabitants of a given region. The term "adivasi" has entrenched itself in ethnographic and historical narrative. According to Mohan Guruswamy, the very word denotes a ‘sense’ of past autonomy, which was disrupted during the colonial period in India and has since
not been restored.[7]

In this paper, whenever the word adivasi is used, it basically refers to the tribes and groups residing in the sub-continent apart from the North-Eastern region.

According to the last census of 2001, the total tribal population in India amounts to about 8 per cent of the net population of the country. Following the Gonds, the Santhals (4.2 million) are numerically the majority amongst the tribes. And interestingly, Central India is the region housing around three-fourth of the total tribal population of the nation-state.


The Present Upsurge

Ranajit Guha’s conclusion regarding the ‘consciousness’ of the subaltern tribal may be debated. He states that the peasant or the tribal ‘revolts consciously’ and ‘does not drift’ into a rebellion. [8]

The nature of post-2004 upsurge in the Adivasi heartland brings this core assertion of Guha further under the scanner. There is no gainsaying the fact that Adivasis have, from time to time, repulsed ‘oppression from above’ as can be deciphered from history. However, post-2004, the formation of a united Communist Party of India (Maoist) [CPI-M] has had a distinct bearing on the ultra-radicalization (or militarisation) of the tribal protests.

It may be safely concluded that at the outset, the ordinary Adivasi was disconnected from the ideological moorings of the intelligentsia, professing Maoist dogmas. The concepts of ‘protracted people’s war’ and ‘comprador-bourgeoisie’ image of the authorities as propagandized by the CPI-M politburo could have hardly been appreciated by the tribal.

Nevertheless, with progress of time, with consequent ideological proselytization – which was facilitated by the lack of effective governmental structures in those regions; some of the Adivasis were indeed indoctrinated. But even this does not indicate that the so-called ‘Red Corridor’ is ‘Red’. It is ‘red’, no doubt, but due to incessant bloodletting because of the constant fighting between two warring parties. One party is led by the CPI-M leaders and the other party is the Indian state.

This is a war, rather a ‘bad war’. Technically speaking, it is viewed as a ‘low-intensity conflict’ from the perspective of the Indian state whereas the Maoists view it through the prism of ‘guerilla warfare’ in the line of Mao Zedong.



Dialectics

Opinions of contemporary scholars and writers have varied regarding the ongoing ‘conflict’ in the fat strip of land stretching from the Indo-Nepal border in the north to the Nallamalai jungles in the south.
Aruna Roy, Mahasweta Devi et al. firmly believe that there exists maladministration and misgovernance in the tribal areas. [9] However they have overtly not adhered to the view that the ‘Maoist-type of insurgency’ is the acceptable format of protest. They basically stress on ‘separating’ the tribal-adivasi from the Maoist insurgent. [10]

On the other hand, Arundhati Roy opines that the Maoists have in essence granted the tribal-adivasis a semblance of dignity.[11] At least, the importation of the gun; according to Roy, if not the ideology, has given the poverty-stricken adivasi a weapon to engineer ‘survival’; if not emancipation.

Bela Bhatia too, while analysing the Naxalite movement in Central Bihar agrees that the Naxalites (pre-2004 era) empowered the labouring and oppressed classes of the region. Nonetheless, she feels that the Naxalite leaders are ‘not interested’ (emphasis added) in ‘development’ and hence the quality of life in the villages have not improved. [12]

Gautam Navlakha even goes to the extent of conflating the tribal with the armed maoist. He puts forth the argument that the Union and state governments have unleashed the brutal police action against the Maoists as the latter is the major impediment towards the implementation of neo-liberal policies. [13]

In this aspect however, if one concurs with Arundhati Roy, then one is led to understand that Guha’s element of ‘consciousness’ (if at all there is such) is provided by the Maoist leadership. Does Roy intend to say that the Maoist leadership (who are mostly urban-bred intellectuals) alongwith their dogmatic concepts associated with the ‘1930s China’ have essentially provided the necessary ‘consciousness’ to the Adivasis?

If that is agreed upon, then how does one explain the host of tribal uprisings in a non-Maoist political landscape during the Imperial Raj? On the other hand, if we completely disagree with Roy, then surely we are led to accept the discourse that the urban intellectuals have acted as ‘usurpers’ in the tribal domain which upholds the spirit of primus inter pares.

A Kobal Ghandy or a Ganapathy have simply displaced a modern-day Birsa Munda or a Sido. Instead of being the torch-bearers for the ‘subaltern adivasi’, the Maoist leadership seems to have undertaken a ‘struggle for power’ enmeshed in their own abstraction of dismantling the comprador-bourgeoisie Indian democracy.

To a large extent, this idea seems to be echoed by past Naxalite leaders like Kanu Sanyal and Azizul Haq. They hold the opinion that the present Maoist struggle is nothing but a power struggle and is using the tribal peoples as pawns. They strictly abhor this mindless violence. [14,15]

One thing, however, is noteworthy and deserves attention. If the urban-bred intellectuals are merely perceived as ‘foreigners’ in the adivasi heartland, then how could they extend their influence? Actually, it is a bare fact that the palpable absence of any pro-people authoritative structure in about one-fourth of the Indian landmass created a power vacuum in those regions. Compounding it was the over-exploitation by the unholy nexus of money-lenders, bureaucrats, politicians and corporate honchos.

Thus quite naturally, the ‘intellectual foreigner’ appeared to the adivasi as the neo-Birsa. Hence, Birsa’s chants of ‘Katong Baba Katong’ (O father, kill kill) of 1899 echoed in the form of the Liberation slogan:

Khet par adhikar ke liye ladho, desh me janawad ke lie badho
(Fight for land rights, march towards democracy in the country)

or

the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) slogan of
Apni satta, apna kanoon (Our power, our law). [16]

In sum, there can hardly be any denial that post-2004, the tribal upsurge in the so-called ‘Red Corridor’ has visibly shaped up as a formidable insurgency so as to give the Home Ministry some sleepless nights. There is in fact, no need to check the veracity of this fact as Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh himself has acknowledged that the Maoist insurgency is the ‘biggest’ internal security threat to the nation-state. And the insurgency has also led the Home Ministry to formulate the Operation Green Hunt (allegedly a media-invented term) to rein in the ‘ruffians’.


What should the Government Do?

In these circumstances, the Indian government finds itself in a quagmire. Would law and order be given priority or socio-economic development and empowerment to the tribal weigh higher than the former? It appears like the proverbial chicken-egg problem.

In order to eradicate such a baffling situation, the Indian policy makers have embarked on a two-pronged strategy to deal with the insurgency. They have initiated a unified command structure under the advisory jurisdiction of Army personnel encompassing the major provinces afflicted with this ‘menace’. [17]

And simultaneously, the Union government plans to go ahead with its socio-economic packages for the ‘undeveloped islands’ within the subcontinent.

This strategy, however, do not exhibit any novelty as also there is nothing ‘new’ in the government’s experience regarding the insurgency. It is a four-decade old problem. Though it subsided in the late 1970s and was dormant in the 1980s and 90s; Andhra Pradesh was to feel the jolts of the shock many a times in the late 1990s which culminated at the failed assassination attempt of its erstwhile Chief Minister. The machinery of the province did react and it was ruthless in its execution. It prepared an elite band of ‘Greyhounds’; on most occasions manned by the Indian Police Service officers and clubbed it with a penetrative intelligence department.

The strategy worked quite successfully. Incarceration and annihilation of the top brass of the Maoist leadership obliterated the preponderance of the Naxalites in the province and they were forced to shift base to neighbouring Chattisgrah. The ultras were forced to form a new epicenter: Dantewada-Bastar region of central India.


The COIN

If we talk about Counterinsurgency (COIN) in today’s era, then it shall be hard to extricate ourselves from a reference to the American definition of the same. The US COIN manual [18] authored by David Petraues et al. is a meaty, scholarly treatise of years of experience of several military generals who withstood different kinds of insurgencies across various territorial domains and in challenging conditions. In fact, it is heavily influenced by the writings of David Galula: a French military officer who worked upon his country’s experience in Algeria. Moreover, the Vietnam case has invariably been a cogent input for the COIN manual.

In fact, earlier in the same year when the US COIN Manual was published, the Indian Army also came out with a doctrinal treatise to counter insurgencies. It was emblematic of the varied experiences that the Indian Army had had in combating insurgencies in the North-East and Kashmir for over five decades. The Indian manual resonated to a considerable extent with its American counterpart, though the preparation of the manuscripts had no correlation as such. The basic premise of both the documents was to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local populace and use military action sparingly. [19]

In a post cold-war world, insurgencies fomented by non-state actors have come upfront; especially through the case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. Be it the Sunni Muslims in the former region or the bellicose Pashtuns in the latter, it seems that insurgency has come to live with us. And thus COIN, or the American COIN is supposed to be the paradigm solution, for the menace. An influential section of the American army and marines (Petraues, John Nagl and others) would have us believe that the US-COIN is the panacea for all forms of ‘parasitic’ insurgencies in the world.

The American COIN bases itself on the three-phase doctrine of “Clear, Hold and Build (CHB)”. It stresses more on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the denizens rather than alienating them in the process of ‘hunting down’ the ‘bad insurgents’. A ‘bad Taliban’ (a hardcore militiaman) may be a Pashtun, but that should not encourage a US-marine to randomly pump artillery into a habitat where he has presumably taken shelter. Firing bullets into that house would necessarily kill few civilian Pashtuns. In the long run, a series of similar incidents would inflame the passions of more ‘civilian Pashtuns’ who through their tribal ‘jirgas’ (tribal assemblies) shall spew venom against the Americans: may be by bolstering the rank and file of the Taliban.

Thus, the very purpose of ‘defeating’ the insurgency will remain unfulfilled if such a policy is undertaken. So, the solution is supposedly the CHB-COIN. In the first phase, try and clear the targeted area of the hardcore militants (Clear Phase). Thereafter, Hold the area against the regrouping of and consequent recapture by the insurgents. Once the “hold” phase has been achieved for a considerable period of time, the Build Phase can be implemented; i.e. try to put in a pro-people, non-corrupt efficient administration.

On paper at least, the CHB-COIN looks absolutely fine. However, on practical terms, it can only be sustained and can achieve a definite degree of success if ‘time’ and ‘resources’ are put in adequate amounts; e.g. a troop ratio of about 10:1 (against the insurgents) can tip the war in favour of the state actor (the Indian experience claims so). No doubt, finances would be no less than astronomical, at least as far as Afghanistan is concerned.
USA proclaims that their version of the COIN has been triumphant in Iraq and hence can be a viable model for other countries as well. Will it be beneficial for India to adopt the COIN model against the ongoing Maoist insurgency and blend it with the existing counterinsurgency philosophy of the country? And more so when it is imperative to ‘separate’ the adivasi from the insurgent.

Actually on the ground, the Americans are employing the COIN alongwith the targeted drone-attacks against the top Taliban-AlQaeda leadership. India, on the other hand, is following a ‘diluted’ version of the American two-pronged strategy. Socio-economic development in simultaneity with paramilitary action is a covert application of the CHB doctrine. And in addition to that, the targeted annihilation of as well as sending the CPI-M politburo members to the hoosegow is a ‘mellowed down’ format of the Drone doctrine enunciated by American Vice-president Joe Biden.

India’s own experience with insurgency has been as old as the republic itself. Kashmir, the North-East, Punjab and the 1967-Naxalite uprising must have taught the administrative machinery sufficient lessons. That is the reason that probably today; the Indian policy-makers are more into thinking (or re-thinking) about the implementation of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). At the same time, the Union government just cannot loll on the sofa by saying that ‘law and order’ is a ‘state subject’ as per the seventh schedule of the constitution because the problem is just not (emphasis added) a law and order problem. The horizon has extended beyond ordinary perception.
At the same time, it is a challenge for the Union government to go ahead with a unified approach against the insurgency when it straddles across many states and the provinces have different governments under contrasting party banners. 

However, it has been seen that such a scenario does not deter the respective provincial governments in colluding with each other against the insurgents. For instance, Chattisgarh has shown that both the centrist-UPA and the right-wing assembly can act in unison in overthrowing the militancy. Nevertheless, the weird scheme of Salwa Judum (bestowing arms to non-Maoist groups and encouraging mutual annihilation) has exacerbated the problem rather than mitigating it.


Hard COIN

There is another model of COIN. It has tasted huge success in subduing an apparently indomitable three-decade old insurgency. It is the Sri Lankan version of ‘hard COIN’. Rajapaksa’s modus operandi was crystal clear. He obfuscated the Jaffna war zone from any ‘non-official’ media. He attacked the LTTE guerillas like a guerilla; i.e. by deploying small units, each comprising around eight to ten commandos. The intelligence network was stepped up and factionalism within LTTE was encouraged; for instance, the faction led by Col Karuna cut-off a vital eastern arm for Velupillai. Rule of law went haywire, but Rajapaksa achieved what he set out for: the decimation of the LTTE. In the process, scores of civilian Tamils were displaced, thousands of them maimed and hundreds of innocents butchered. [20]

On a similar wavelength, the Columbian government tackled the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) rebels. Instead of following the decades-old formula of focusing on the ‘narcotic’ aspect of the militancy, the authorities concentrated on the anti-insurgency mode. It followed a mixed diet of the US COIN and the Lankan Hard COIN. Columbia too has tasted success as the FARC rebels are now pursuing peace negotiations with the government. [21]

India had in fact, implemented the so-called Sri Lankan model of COIN during the Punjab insurgency through the instrument of Gill-Doctrine. [22] It was a ‘success’: with some degree of civilian casualty. Actually it was practically easier to follow that approach in Punjab as it was basically an urban insurgency and the possibilities of spilling-over to other provinces were minimal. A similar methodology was applied by India against the rudimentary Naxalite movement which was also essentially urban-centric. Also, it is easy to convince the bulk of the countrymen with regard to the AFSPA [23] in Kashmir and the North-East by invoking the Pakistan and China factors and by stressing on the regional specificities.

Whereas in case of the Red Corridor, the situation is dissimilar as compared to the other experiences India has had. Few things are for sure. The administration has to pursue a COIN- whatever that might be. At the same time, they cannot risk to alienate the adivasis. Moreover, a section of the non-adivasis needs to be explained with regard to the policies in ameliorating the downtrodden. For the Indian government, this is a complex matrix: fallout of decades of administrative fiasco.

Recommendations

  • The Sri Lankan model apparently looks lucrative. However, there are tactical constraints. It shall be a mammoth operational procedure to physically corner the insurgents as they are bound to slip into the neighbouring provinces to ‘live another day’. In Sri Lanka, that was not possible because of geographical isolation of the island.

  • The CPI-M is still a non-conventional guerilla force, far less developed than the LTTE. The latter had developed its air force and navy and more or less had a conventional army wing running parallel to the guerilla combatants. Hence, it took on the Sri Lankan army head-on. The Maoists would hardly take that path. Thus, a full-fledged military operation against them is still not on the cards.

  • Moreover, is army a feasible option at all? The authors do not subscribe to that view. The conflict in the Red Corridor has not reached a crescendo, at least militarily. However, if allowed to go on in this manner, it might reach the zenith in the foreseeable future. Prima facie, army is potent weaponry, but its deployment by all means shall aggravate the wound. Furthermore, the option of using the Armed forces received a jolt when India’s Army General uttered caustic rhetoric regarding deploying them ‘against their own people’. Underscoring a similar rationale, Air Chief Marshall too swayed away from being a part of annihilating ‘our own people’.[24]

  • Presently the CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) needs to be trained in COIN warfare. More jungle warfare schools modeled on the one at Kanker needs to be set up. The irregular militia of Salwa Judum can be incorporated into the CRPF. The irregular militia must be given a facade of legitimacy. Local men with knowledge of the topography and dialect would provide a fillip in COIN operations, no doubt.

  • CRPF needs to be broken down into small groups of anti-insurgency units to “fight a guerilla like a guerilla”. Satellite imagery; i.e. remote sensing techniques to locate the positions of the insurgents could be explored in this regard.

  • The intellectuals must act responsibly as ‘peace brokers’; rather than ‘problem-creators’ by spouting hyperbole.

  • Empowerment of the adivasis may continue in parallel, i.e. revenue-sharing with the adivasis by the corporate bodies. The administration needs to act as a facilitator in this regard. Interestingly, some corporate houses have taken a positive step in this direction. For instance, Tata Steel has called for social infrastructure development in the Maoist areas. Already, ITC has served the peasant community by introducing agri-marketing through Information Technology.[25,26]

  • We beseech the government to consider bringing the ultras to the negotiating table. Yes, that portends the danger of letting them regroup and invigorate. The government ought to stress on the Maoist leadership that ‘genuine’ adivasis must be a party to those talks. Officials experienced in dealing with the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh would bludgeon this argument. Nevertheless, talking seems to be a fair option. But it won’t be unwise to talk with the ultras from a ‘position of strength’.

  • What is ‘a position of strength’? A major counter-offensive by the police and paramilitary in some stronghold of the Maoists would confer that position on the authorities. Or, the setting up of an Army base at the epicentre of the movement. There is a danger though: the cycle of revenge may go on in an unending fashion.

  • It is noteworthy that ‘talking’ to the Leftists shall grant ‘time’ to the government too; something which is necessary so as to devise a coherent policy framework.

  • The policy-makers may contemplate the release of some of the Maoist leaders and use it as a reconciliatory measure; especially those leaders, who are not directly involved with military insurrection.

  • The ‘Andhra Model’ of tackling the Maoists by unleashing ‘terror versus terror’ may be kept in the reserve, lest the talks fail. Surgical strikes against top leaders may lead them to ideological bankruptcy. By all probability, personnel from the “Greyhound” force can ‘coach’ the provincial police forces and the CRPF.

  • The ‘den’ (Dantewada-Bastar region) of the ultras may not be attacked at the outset since that would inflame matters further. Rather, the peripheral outgrowths in other provinces should be pruned off first.

  • The guerrillas plan to ‘circle out’ and capture the Indian cities. The authorities should ‘circle in’ and capture their redoubts.

  • Human intelligence network of the police has to be improved. To achieve that, if needed even ‘bribing’ the local population to alienate them from the ‘hardcore elements’ can be tried. But a grisly methodology like the ‘Salwa Judum’ (using the non-Maoist tribal against the Maoists by supplying arms to them) has to be resisted.

  • Finally, the authorities can attempt to sow seeds of dissension amongst the Maoists; i.e. try for a de-merger of CPI-M into MCC and PWG wings.

Conclusion

There is a long way to traverse before the authorities are able to solve the present imbroglio. In dealing with this cul-de-sac, the Indian government must shed its ambivalence; sooner the better. Actually, from a ‘law and order’ perspective the matter is still simple.

For the sake of argument, we may assume that the insurgency can be quelled based on either the Andhra Model or the Indo-American COIN or Sri Lankan formula. But from a nation’s perspective: alienation of a massive section of the populace is a gamble that probably it just cannot afford. Even if the insurgents are eliminated like the Santhals of 1855-56; what is in store for the future? Say a quarter century down the lane?

The challenge is not only for the present political dispensation but also for the archetypal liberal-bourgeoisie structure based on the western-democratic parliamentary model.

Tribal insurgency is a question which has no unequivocal answers. A complete overhauling of the bureaucratic machinery at some places and refurbishments at almost all places is very much necessary to tackle any future contingency. However, the lack of ‘values’ and ‘ethics’ in the power structures shall be a major impediment.

If ameliorative measures do not fructify (for instance, just implementation of Tribal Rights Act), we may witness a growth in insurgent activities and this time around, with greater expanse and reach.

A recent report (published Sep 28,2010) by India’s leading daily Times of India has a startling revelation that close to 58 per cent of the people in the Naxal-affected districts of Andhra Pradesh ‘appreciates’ Naxalism as a viable option against state exploitation.[27] Considering that Andhra Pradesh is the province from where the Maoists have been hounded out, this is certainly ominous.

References

1: Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, p. 44, Macmillan

2: Swapan Dasgupta, Adivasi Politics in Midnapur, c. 1760-1924, p. 101, Subaltern Studies IV, edited by Ranajjit Guha, Oxford

3: Bipan Chandra et al., India’s Struggle for Independence, p. 48, Penguin

4: ibid, pp. 48-49

5: K Balagopal, Pitting the Tribals against the Non-tribal Poor, Economic and Political Weekly, May 27 1989

6: Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, p. 154, Macmillan

7: Mohan Guruswamy, The Heart of our Darkness, Centre for Policy Alternatives, October 2010

8: E. Sreedharan, A Textbook of Historiography, p. 493, Orient Longman

9 : Aruna Roy, The State will fail if the Army and Air Force are used against the  Maoist, interview to Wall Street Journal, November 03 2009

10: Mahasweta Devi, Government should Talk to Maoists, April 07 2010, Pro Kerala News, http://www.prokerala.com/news/articles/a126638.html

11: Arundhati Roy, Mr Chidambaram’s War, November 09 2009, Outlook India, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?262519

12: Bela Bhatia, The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, Economic and Political Weekly, April 09 2005, pp 1536-1549

13: Gautam Navlakha, Days and Nights in the heartland of Rebellion – In Maoist Land, April 02, 2010, Sanhati, pp. 38-43


15: Jhimli Mukherjee Pandey, Naxal veterans slam Lalgarh misadventure, TNN, June 19 2009, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-06-19/kolkata/28208994_1_naxalites-lalgarh-tribals

16: Bela Bhatia, The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, Economic and Political Weekly, April 09 2005, p. 1536

17: Vinita Priyadershi, Effectiveness of a Unified Command structure in anti-naxal operations, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Article No. 1636, September 01 2010, http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=637&u_id=96

18: Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, December 2006, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C.

19: David P. Fidler, The Indian Doctrine on sub-conventional operations:
Reflections from a U.S. Counterinsurgency perspective, as a chapter in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned (S.Ganguly and D. P. Fidler, eds.) (London: Routledge, 2009)

20: Lionel Beehner, What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN, Small Wars Journal, August 27 2010

21: Wojciech Moskwa, Philippines start new peace talks with Maoists, Reuters Africa, February 15 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE71E1A920110215?sp=true

22: Prem Mahadevan, The Gill Doctrine: A Model for 21st Century Counter-terrorism, Faultlines, Volume 19, April 2008, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume19/Article1.htm

23: A G Noorani, Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act: Urgency of Review, August 22, 2009, vol xliv, no 34, Economic & Political Weekly

24: Uddipan Mukherjee, The Bad War, Uday India, May 08 2010,

25: Tata Steel calls for social infrastructure development in Maoist infested areas, Global News Network, April 13 2010, http://www.globalnewsnetwork.in/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=902

26: Anuradha Himatsingka, ITC e-Choupal to quintuple reach, Economic Times Bureau, Apr 12, 2010, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-04-12/news/27612204_1_choupal-itc-plans-agri-reforms

27: ‘58% in AP say Naxalism is good, finds TOI poll’, TNN, Sep 28 2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com//india/58-in-AP-say-Naxalism-is-good-finds-TOI-poll/articleshow/6639631.cms



A slightly different version of this paper was presented by my co-author Rajarshi Mitra at Jhargram Raj College at a UGC sponsored National Seminar held on 04-05 October 2010.

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